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I. INTRODUCTION  
Oromomo, Natural Park Isiboro Sécure, Cochabamba province. In 
this remote community of central Bolivia, on 29 July 2012, a process of 
consultation began to discuss the intangibility of this territory and the 
measures to protect it from external interferences. This initiative has been 
put in place by the government of Evo Morales to find a solution to a 
conflict with Amazonian indigenous organizations that has been ongoing 
for more than two years now. The node of contention is a road building 
project between the two towns of Villa Tunari and San Ignacio de Moxos 
that would facilitate the communications and connect this area to the trans-
American commercial corridors, thus promoting a new wave of 
development and economic growth. These, at least, are the arguments of 
the government and of its local allies, mainly peasant and coca growers’ 
communities. On the opposite side, other inhabitants of the Isiboro Sécure 
National Park and Indigenous Territory (Territorio Indígena y Parque 
Nacional Isiboro Sécure, TIPNIS)1 are strongly resisting a project that 
would cut across the natural park in which they live, altering its 
environmental and social equilibria. Moreover, they criticize the fact that 
no previous consultation took place with local communities, as established 
by the new Constitution approved in 2009.  
The conflict suddenly reached national and international public 
opinion on August 15, 2011, when more than 2000 people left the town of 
Trinidad and started the Eighth Indigenous March2 for the Defence of 
TIPNIS, which ended in the administrative capital La Paz two month later. 
Through this period, various initiatives of dialogue between the 
government and the indigenous authorities took place. On September 25, 
an episode of repression against the marchers by the Bolivian police raised 
the indignation of national and international public opinion. The indigenous 
protesters did not only demand the suspension of any infrastructural project 
within TIPNIS, but they also added 15 other points to the agenda for 
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negotiation, most of them oriented to preserve the integrity of their 
territory. A few days after the marchers reached La Paz, and under a rising 
public pressure, on October 24, the government promulgated a law (ley 
corta) guaranteeing that the road would not pass through the TIPNIS. 
However, a few weeks later, some Ministers and the President himself 
initiated a campaign in favour of the road construction and for the 
cancellation of the law. As a result, the conflict persisted and in July 2012, 
a process of consultation with the local communities eventually began. 
However, several communities declared themselves against the 
consultation and were unwilling to welcome the entrance in their territory 
of the brigades of the National Census of Population and Households in 
charge of carrying out the consultations. Moreover, they started an 
international campaign, denouncing rights violations to international 
organizations, including the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
and the International Labour Organization. In this context, the 
representative of the Coordinating Committee of Andean Indigenous 
Organizations (Coordinadora Andina de Organizaciones Indígenas, 
CAOI), Rafael Quispe, declared: “If it is demonstrated that the rights of 
indigenous peoples have been violated, there will be repercussions for 
Morales. From the indigenous President he was supposed to be, he has 
become a violator of the rights of the natives”, adding that the “TIPNIS is 
just the tip of the iceberg”. 
These statements reflect the tense situation prevalent in Bolivia 
between indigenous sectors and the government of Evo Morales. We are 
evidently very far from the time when the new president was invested in a 
ceremony in the Tiwanaku archaeological site, where Aymara jatiris 
(religious authorities) gave him the traditional stick of command on behalf 
of the indigenous peoples of Bolivia. How is it possible that in just a few 
years, and after compelling electoral results that reconfirmed Morales as 
Bolivian president in December 2009, the relationship with the indigenous 
movements suffered such a radical deterioration? And is this change 
irreversible? What are its causes, the broader context and the other actors 
that contributed to this conflictive scenario?  
This paper will provide some insights that help understanding these 
new configurations. It will present an analysis of the most important 
institutional and normative reforms, which contributed to a process of 
ethnicization of the country’s social and political life and the effects on the 
social movements’ articulation, with an emphasis on the ambivalent 
relationship between the indigenous and the peasant movements. Both the 
set of reforms as well as the new social and political dynamics contributed 
to shaping a contemporary scenario of fragmentation and conflict, which 
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finds one of its main and most symbolic expressions in conflicts over land 
and resources such as the dispute around the TIPNIS.3 
 
II. FROM THE ‘SOCIAL WARS’ TO THE ‘PROCESO DE CAMBIO’ 
In Bolivia, the new millennium marked the beginning of a drastic 
renovation of political and social dynamics. Some scholars have labelled 
this phase the new ‘rebel cycle’ (Esperandín López and Iglesias Turrión 
2007:189). Likewise, picking up the expression used by the anthropologist 
Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui to name the Quechua and Aymara rebellions 
during the first half of the 20th century, the Bolivian Vice President and 
sociologist Álvaro García Linera (2010:382) defined this period as the new 
‘indigenous insurgency’, emphasizing the ethnic character of the social 
mobilization. The popular and journalistic narrative eventually opted for 
the more drastic and dramatic, although improper term of ‘wars’, namely 
the Water War and the Gas War (Dangl 2007). Beyond the differences in 
terminology and definitions, from 2000 to 2005 Bolivia underwent a tough 
political crisis that, in some occasions, reached high peaks of violence.  
The main protagonists of the mobilizations during this five-year 
period were rural peasant, indigenous and urban neighbourhood 
organizations. They were the expression of problems of poverty and social 
exclusion that concern a high percentage of the Bolivian population. 
Moreover, in this phase, they were also able to strengthen their 
potentialities in terms of political action. This accumulation of political and 
social capitals was crucial for the construction of the counter-hegemonic 
project that challenged the dominant elites, and, through an extraordinary 
grassroots mobilization, eventually reached power through elections in 
2005.  
This crisis can also be interpreted as the result of the decline and 
failure of the socio-political and economic neoliberal model of the previous 
two decades. On the one side, it contributed to highlight the limits of the 
projects of modernization and economic growth postulated by the 
neoliberal governments under the so-called Washington Consensus. The 
protests reflected a negative or a modestly positive trend of economic 
indexes that failed to adhere to the expectations generated during the first 
phase of structural adjustments’ implementation. On the other side, the 
crisis accounted for the increase of socio-economic gaps and the precarious 
results of the neoliberal multiculturalist model4 and the so-called 
‘democracia pactada’ to address problems of political representation, social 
exclusion, ethnic and regional fragmentation (Mayorga 2007).  
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Ethnic identities, symbols and narratives were crucial factors of 
social cohesion during the conformation of the ‘counter-hegemonic hub’ 
(Esperandín López and Iglesias Turrión 2007:53). “The indio was 
converted in a popular cohesive identity for the social sectors that were 
confronting the effects of the free market policies” (Stefanoni 2010:20). In 
particular, an ethnic-based narrative was generated, which was able to 
catalyze both the indigenous native movements5 as well as the peasant 
unions6, redirecting the trend of disarticulation and social fragmentation 
that they had experienced since the 1980s (Fontana2012c). As Andrew 
Canessa noted:  
Not only have indigenous people gone from the margins to the centre of 
Bolivian politics; but, rather more interestingly, it appears that central political 
issues, national issues that affect everyone, are represented as indigenous issues 
– after all, there is nothing intrinsically indigenous about a gas pipeline. 
Indigeneity is becoming the language of protests over resources and the defence 
of the patria against the forces of globalization; it is breaking out of its specific 
concerns and offering a language of political engagement for a much broader 
public (2006:254). 
The electoral victory of Evo Morales in 2005 and of its Movement 
Toward Socialism (Movimiento al socialismo, MAS) marked the end of the 
socio-political crisis of the previous five years and gave birth to a new 
political era. It opened a delicate moment of transition of an ideology and 
political project from a counter-hegemonic condition (i.e. against the 
dominant neoliberal block) to the hegemonic occupation of power (Postero 
2010). This complex dynamic, which includes the reconfiguration of 
political dynamics and agenda, has been called the Process of Change 
(Proceso de Cambio). One of the key efforts was to pass from a strictly 
representative model of democracy to another one, based on the trinitarian 
formula of a “participative, representative and communitarian demo-
cracy”7.  
The country has entered a new political era, whose main innovations 
are the leading role of the indigenous popular sectors as the dominant 
partner in the ruling coalition (García Linera 2010:38), and the paradox of 
an unprecedented peasant political hegemony within a predominantly urban 
country (Do Alto 2011). Indeed strong and repeated references to the 
Andean culture and the indigenous roots of Bolivian people were important 
narrative and semiotic resources used by the government to help carry out 
its ambitious social and political agendas. Through this new form of 
strategic essentialism, the culturalist discourse of the Morales government 
contributes to a general feeling of pride and sense of community mainly 
among rural social movements (Postero 2007). At the same time, the 
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heterogeneity of the coalition in power raised many problems in terms of 
the management of diversity and potential tensions among social sectors, as 
I will show in the following paragraphs.  
The Bolivian sociologist Fernando Calderón (2008:66) named the 
new Bolivian political project ‘neodevelopmentalist indigenism’. Its main 
characteristics are the central role of social movements, especially 
indigenous ones; a search for inclusion and egalitarian order, based on a 
rather standardized development proposal that relies upon commodities 
incomes (what has been called neo-extractivism, Gudynas 2010). This is 
paired with a complicated negotiation with transnational enterprises led by 
a state that purports to be strong and stable, but that still harbours chronic 
weaknesses. Another characteristic is a national and anti-imperialistic 
rhetoric that dominates international relations and is used as a political 
instrument when it is time to consolidate internal consensus. This definition 
seems to be excellent for describing the first phase of the process, while 
recently it is probably more appropriate to invert the order of the pairing. 
Indeed the latest political experience is rather characterized by the 
strengthening of a less innovative development path, mainly backed by 
state capitalism, commodities exploitation and basic measures of 
redistribution and poverty reduction8. At the same time, the ethno-cultural 
issue has receded to the background, practically abandoning even its 
discursive centrality. This is why ‘indigenist developmentalism’ is perhaps 
a more appropriate definition. 
This shift is an important indicator for interpreting the complex 
relationship that links Evo Morales and his political movement with the 
‘indigenous issue’. Contrary to what one could expect, the ethnic issue has 
not been a driving force due to the election of Morales. Nonetheless, it has 
gained a key position on the political agenda as a result of a long process of 
change, strongly influenced by the international debate on multiculturalism, 
which developed during the neoliberal epoch (1980s and 1990s). As Hervé 
Do Alto (2012) notes in seeking to clarify the relationship between the 
electoral ascension of Morales and the politicization of the indigenous 
issue, if these two dynamics fed each other during the 1990s and 2000s, 
this was possible only through a precarious political configuration. In other 
words, “Morales and his team were not proponents of an ‘indianist’ 
agenda; rather they saw to the imposition of certain relevant claims under 
that very agenda – from which however they paradoxically received some 
political benefits within a process of legitimization of the ‘indigenous 
issue’ and the ethnicization of Bolivian society” (Do Alto 2012:41-42). 
Consequently, it was a political reason more than an ideological inspiration 
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that places the indigenous issue on the agenda of Morales. This was the 
case timidly before the electoral victory, and more prominently afterwards. 
A strong indigenous rhetoric and symbolism became dominant 
within Morales’ discourse, and in the new iconography of power, 
characterized by a president who prefers local traditional dress and coca-
leaf necklaces over conventional suits and ties. These semiotic and 
discursive features are, however, in strong tension with the government’s 
political agenda and praxes, where a reformist and ‘descolonizing’ horizon 
cohabits with old corporatist models of power management. Those tensions 
acquire an ideological dimension through the hybrid formula of the 
‘democratic revolution’ or the ‘revolution within democracy’ (Morales 
Ayma 2006). This appears as one of the cornerstones of the new political 
discourse and a concept coming from the very epistemology that the 
coalition in power uses to describe itself. In this sense, the Masista 
discourse is shaped as a teleological argument of modernity based on 
development through commodities exploitation. At the same time, the 
Masista teleology, and its utopian component in particular, introduces 
elements that are commonly considered anti-modern, namely concerning its 
ties with the past, tradition, the communitarian social system as promoters 
of change. Within this discourse, time heterogeneity entails deep 
antinomies in the coexistence of opposite dimensions: tradition and 
revolution; progress and conservatism; decolonization proposals and neo-
extractivism. 
This mix generates raises various epistemological problems 
embedded in the Masista narratives, rooted on one hand, on the crisis in 
which the historical project of modernity is mired and, on the other hand, 
on the difficulties entailed in the effort to conciliate the “radical 
heterogeneity” of the subaltern with the “homogenizing reason of the state” 
(Sanjinés 2009:97). All of these contradictions emerged at crucial stages 
throughout the process of institutional reforms and, particularly, during the 
negotiation for the drafting of a new Constitution. Indeed the Constitutional 
process was highly contentious and even involved episodes of violence. 
MAS didn’t manage to win the two-thirds necessary to carry any decision 
within the constitutional assembly, being therefore forced to confront a 
harsh opposition by the right and the eastern elite leaders (Postero 2007). 
The latter catalyzed their consensus and opposition strategy around the 
demand for regional autonomy rooted in racist fears and long-term popular 
regional resentments against La Paz (Gustafson 2006). Civic leaders used a 
racist counter-discourse to mobilize its social bases, triggering episodes of 
violence and provoking the paralysis of the assembly’s work during seven 
months. Even after an agreement was reached, tensions persisted especially 
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around contentious topics such as land reform, autonomy, and indigenous 
rights and the constitution was eventually voted in a climate of emergency 
and open conflict (Postero 2010). 
Beyond the constitutional process, other issues remained highly 
polarized and in certain cases led to unclear and contradictory stands by 
state authorities. A key opposition, for example, separated the discourse on 
the defence of the Pachamama (the Mother Earth) proposed within 
important international arenas (such as the World People’s Conference on 
Climate Change in Cochabamba in 2009 or the Cancun Conference on 
Climate of 2010), and an agenda for national development based on the 
intense exploitation of non-renewable and renewable natural resources as 
well as the strengthening the country’s infrastructural network which would 
affect protected natural areas. 
 
III. INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS: TOWARDS A PLURINATIONAL MODEL OF STATE  
In post-colonial countries, especially in Latin America, criticisms 
and disappointments with respect to the multicultural policies of the 1980s 
and 1990s9 gave birth to new normative proposals that are now 
experiencing their first empirical and political tests. In Ecuador and 
Bolivia, the intercultural and plurinational paradigms became part of the 
agenda of the new leftist governments. In this framework, interculturality is 
meant to be an ethic and political principle that should orient the 
construction and maintenance of difference within heterogeneous societies. 
At the discursive level, this is presented as an effort to overcome the 
multicultural paradigm, since, while multiculturalism is focused on the 
improvement of social competition through tolerance, interculturalism 
would look for an articulation, a cohabitation that overcomes cultural 
coexistence and emphasizes the interaction among diversities. This implies 
a political project to mobilize traditionally marginalized sectors of post-
colonial societies, in particular peasant and indigenous groups (Giarracca 
2005). 
Bolivia is certainly one of the most interesting cases to monitor the 
impact of new intercultural and plurinational paradigms on political and 
social life. Indeed the implementation of a plurinational citizenship is 
probably more advanced than elsewhere. Bolivia is reinterpreting the 
concept of citizenship through cultural lenses, implementing a radical 
process of institutional and normative engineering. Also, a theoretical-
normative debate on the need to rethink the very foundations of modern 
representative democracy has taken place. The new Constitution is the most 
important example of the renovation of the new legal and institutional 
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paradigm. Among the main points, it ratifies the recognition of thirty-six 
groups of native indigenous peoples10; it permits only one presidential re-
election and incorporates revocatory referendum for the President, 
governors and mayors’ mandates. It also establishes that the judges of the 
Supreme and Constitutional Courts will be elected through universal 
suffrage, from among a list of candidates previously approved by the 
Plurinational Legislative Assembly (the Congress). Moreover, the 
geopolitical paradigm of the unitarian republican state was substituted by a 
new plurinational state that institutes indigenous, municipal, departmental 
and regional autonomies. In this new framework, elections of local 
authorities are permitted on the basis of customary norms, and a 
communitarian justice within the ‘native indigenous peasant’ juridical 
framework is being introduced.  
In practice, not all these political and normative changes correspond 
to new initiatives pushed by MAS and the popular coalition in power. 
Some of them rather represent a deepening of the neoliberal agenda of 
reforms implemented in the previous decades and a process of 
strengthening of the indigenous movement since the 1980s. During the 
1990s, some important institutional changes were promoted, among them: 
the formal recognition of the multicultural nature of the Bolivian state; the 
administrative decentralization through the institution of mayors’ popular 
elections and the municipalities’ financial autonomy (Popular Participation 
Law); and the creation of the Native Communitarian Lands (Tierras 
Comunitarias de Origen, TCOs), i.e. large extensions of land titled in 
favour of indigenous peoples to guarantee access to and control of their 
ancestral territory. Indigenous and peasant leaders took advantage of these 
opportunities, firstly occupying local political charges and, afterwards, 
delegations within the National Congress (Stefanoni 2012:7). This 
eventually paved the way for the raise of a rural-based movement such as 
the MAS (Zuazo 2009; Do Alto 2011).  
From a broader perspective, normative instruments were introduced 
that strengthened a process of citizenship’s ethnicization (Lacroix 2007a 
and b; Gros 1999), promoted by the Bolivian state as well as by other 
important actors such as social movements and international cooperation. 
The political and cultural problems that this strategy tries to confront are 
related to an endemic lack of citizenship, which, after the failure of the 
national revolution’s corporatist project and the neoliberal program, new 
ethno-cultural kind of policies try to fill. The issue at stake is an old one. In 
the words of Chantal Mouffe (1992:5) the question is: “how to make our 
belonging to different communities of values, language, culture and others 
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compatible with our common belonging to a political community whose 
role we have to accept”. 
The new political transition Bolivia is living through could be read as 
the latest attempt, from a culturalist viewpoint, to resolve the structural 
problem arising from the gaps in the process of creation and consolidation 
of the modern nation-state and of its basic pillars (territorial control, 
equality of citizens in front of the law, separation of powers, and the 
creation of a national ‘imagined community’), that are themselves rooted in 
the colonial past. This can be considered as a new manifestation of a long-
lasting crisis. Bolivia is adopting a new recipe to confront a condition of 
nationality, statehood and endemically weak citizenship, affirming a 
project that is no longer based on the political or the economic, but on the 
cultural and, more precisely, on the pluricultural realm. The answer to the 
defeat of the construction of an efficient nation-state in post-colonial 
contexts presents an innovation inasmuch as it does not attempt to re-
conduct the process and find solutions within the dominant model and its 
institutional instruments, but looks for alternative models in which 
autochthonous reality would ‘more comfortably fit’. The response in this 
sense has potential for innovation (Fontana 2013). But in practice it also 
presents relevant problems: its most important fragility, in functional terms, 
is perhaps the incompatibility between developmentalism and indigenism; 
and, in terms of state ethics, its anchorage into culture and ethnicity as 
criteria of resource allocation and of rights entitlement, i.e. the potential 
incompatibility between the ethnic (or pluri-ethnic) state and the principle 
of equal citizenship.  
The definition of ‘indigenist neo-developmentalism’ embodies these 
tensions, i.e. the problematic contradiction implicit in the nexus between 
ethnic identities and resource allocation; a trend towards pluralism and 
promotion of indigeneity opposed to the need to keep walking a path 
towards development and economic growth. These contradictions were 
partially resolved in discourse, at least in the first period of the Morales’ 
government. However on the legal and practical level, tensions still persist.  
The effort to harmonize, at least in the first place, developmentalist 
goals with the relativist indigenist perspective implied an important change: 
weakening the persistent racist and colonialist visions on the ‘indigenous’, 
it paved the way for an historical renovation. At the same time, this formula 
is the gravitational point of some the most important tensions embedded in 
this political project. If developmentalism is defined as a teleology11 that 
has accumulation and productivity as ineluctable goals, it stands in an 
incompatible position with respect to a supposed ‘indigenous 
epistemology’. Some analysts foresee the eventual prevalence of the former 
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over the latter for the main reason that development has a more generalized 
consensus among the population and within the government, than 
indigenism (Molina 2010). This would justify the growing subordination of 
indigenous peoples’ interests to broader state interests, a state that is 
however led by an ‘indigenous-popular and peasant movement (Canessa 
2012). Other scholars argue, on the contrary, that industrialization and 
indigenism are not necessarily incompatible and could even be 
complementary. This would require the implementation of measures, which 
exclusively favour the indigenous sector (Ayo, quoted in Molina 2010). 
The latter point raises the important issue of who is taking advantage from 
the economic policies implemented by the MAS government and of the 
complex relationship between neoliberal and post-neoliberal economic 
strategies. Nancy Postero expresses a quite optimistic view, pointing out 
how Morales and his administration “not only are trying to move beyond 
neoliberalism but also may be working toward vernacularizing liberalism to 
make it more democratic and more relevant to Bolivia’s indigenous 
populations” (Postero 2010:62). On the other side, according to Jeffery 
Webber (2011), Morales administration did not do much more than merely 
‘reconstitute’ the neoliberal model, instead of destroying it.  
Other factors further complicate the situation, such as the fact that no 
perfect equation can be identified between social groups and their 
ideological and political positioning. This is clear for instance looking at 
the mismatching between self-identification with an indigenous group and 
the adoption of an indigenist ideology. Indeed, recent conflict between 
indigenous people and a self-styled indigenous state has brought to the fore 
some of the paradoxes and contradictions within the concept of indigeneity 
itself (Canessa 2012, McNeish 2013). The fact that indigenous identities 
can be complex and slippery categories was also confirm by the last census 
(2012), whose results highlighted the ‘disappearance’ of 20 per cent of the 
population self-identifying as indigenous over a decade (from 62 to 42 per 
cent). Moreover, social groups that might be considered indigenous 
(including the rising Aymara urban middle and upper classes and the 
Aymara and Quechua cocaleros) are very much in favour of Morales’ 
economic policies, including the neo-extractivist turn, and they are 
benefitting from them in different ways (McNeish 2013; Fabricant 2013). 
On the other hand, a growing part of the white and mestizo urban middle 
class is sensitive to environmental problems and indigenous rights. This 
might reflect the changing dynamic of identity politics in the country. New 
questions about political economy alongside cultural rights are emerging, 
in particular concerning how extraction as a means of addressing social 
concerns can create exclusions for those who live and articulate cultural 
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demands on territories rich in natural resources, in opposition to those who 
are migrants that may also make cultural claims to indigeneity in certain 
contexts but have a fundamentally different vision of development. At the 
same time, the link between ethnic-identitarian origins and systems of 
resources, rights and power allocation also presents important problems, 
concerning for example the operationalization of ethnic categories and the 
high risk of instrumentalization (Fontana and Sparti 2012; Fontana 2012a). 
 
IV. INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT AND POLITICAL ETHNICIZATION  
The recent institutional changes promoted by the Morales’ 
administration have been both the framework as well as one of the main 
consequences of the identitarian and organizational changes that the 
country has been living through over the last decades. Indeed, the new state 
engineering, and the process of constitutional negotiation were confronted, 
both at the national and local level, with the historical structural plurality of 
Bolivian social movements and collective identities (classist, ethnic, 
regional…).12 
Latin America has traditionally been a fertile land for the study of 
social movements, especially by scholars, who have often been activists at 
the same time, influenced by the New Social Movements paradigm 
(Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Escobar, Alvarez and Dagnino 1998; Calderón 
1986; Calderón and Dos Santos 1987). At the beginning of the second 
decade of the 21st century, Latin American social movements are still a 
fascinating issue for researchers, who tend to put a particular emphasis on 
their ‘globalizing resistance’, i.e. their role as bulwarks against capitalism 
and globalization (Stahler-Sholk, Vanden and Kuecker 2007 and 2008; 
Stahler-Sholk and Vanden 2011; Pleyers 2010). 
From the 1980s and especially after the Zapatista rise on the global 
scene, the attention of Latin Americanist sociologists was concentrated on 
and fascinated with what Yvon Le Bot (2009) calls ‘la grand révolte 
indienne’ (‘the great indigenous revolt’), i.e. the ensemble of ethnically-
based social movements that started to revitalize and gain importance all 
over the region, from Mexico to Argentina. At the same time, the issue of 
identity, and in particular of ethnic identity, was introduced to the political 
and social realms by new indigenous movements that were able to position 
themselves as enacting a concrete project of change. These are movements 
that respond to new logics that could not be analysed only through classic 
social sciences categories and, even less, through classist-based models that 
do not consider the centrality of identity claims. They generally avoid 
violence, have ambivalent relationships – sometimes of rupture rather than 
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continuity – with the previous historical struggles, and move within a 
complex spatio-temporal dimension, which includes local, national and 
global spheres. However, although their identity is a central issue, it is also 
important to note that their claims are often predominantly social and 
economic. These claims are usually related to special rights and territorial 
control (which is why a purely identity-based explanation is not completely 
satisfactory). Territorial claims became central articulators of the fight of 
Latin American indigenous movements since the 1980s (Lacroix 2012a). In 
the following decade, these movements arose in the political scene of 
various countries, in particular Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, Colombia and 
Guatemala. In the first two cases, political forces tied to social coalitions 
managed to win the elections and are now in power.  
In the Bolivian case, MAS came to power supported by a strong rural 
social coalition. The Unity Pact (Pacto de Unidad) – an umbrella 
organization that constitutes the main popular basis of Morales’ 
government – is formed by three peasant and two indigenous organizations. 
All these organizations are characterized by a sort of communitarian meta-
identity.13 Especially in the rural world, a communitarian view of social life 
prevails, which is ruled by rigid corporative and associative mechanisms. 
These mechanisms generate strong collective identities of a normative type 
that precede many forms of individual manifestation and are used to wield 
social control, formulate claims, name representatives, and shape a civic 
morale and a core of ethical norms. Since the ‘principle of community’ 
works as a powerful form of social cohesion, these mechanisms are often 
very efficient for collective action coordination. Indeed, the refusal to 
assume more or less implicit normative prescriptions that form part of the 
communitarian meta-identity means the risk of expulsion from the 
collectivity and the deprivation of protection and of the mutual aid at the 
basis of these societies. In other words, there are strong contextual 
disincentives against the exit from a communitarian framework, pursuing a 
strategy that gives the primacy to the individual over the collectivity 
(Hirschman 1970; Leonardi, Nanetti and Putnam 1993; Bauman 2001).  
In the presence of a geopolitical map where there is not a dominant 
communitarian meta-identity (such as the nation), but multiple 
communitarian meta-identities each one with its territory, its narrative and 
cultural traits, the probability of being involved in conflict increases. First, 
this is due to the structural characteristics of identities themselves (they are 
always defined in opposition; sometimes they get strengthened by the ties 
to a territory, resources and spaces of power). Secondly, the trend towards 
fragmentation also increases the probability that one identity group will 
seek to dominate the others. Finally, as I will show, a fragmented 
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environment characterized by strong ethno-cultural identities is a relatively 
delicate field in which to introduce positive discrimination norms that can 
eventually trigger performative effects, favouring one identity over another.  
In the Bolivian context, all of these elements contributed to making 
the political tasks of MAS and its role as a catalyzer of rural and popular 
organizations particularly complicated. Although, since Morales’ elections, 
there has been an effort of articulation of the two main identitarian and 
corporatist forms of the rural world – peasant and indigenous – the 
discursive as well as the inter-organizational system of alliances are 
evidently fragile and in tension with the forces of fragmentation that have 
been manifest over the last two decades and that are still active.  
This situation is linked with the collateral risks coming from political 
attitudes and institutional frameworks, which tend towards the ethnicization 
of politics and citizenship. From a theoretical view point, identities are 
characterized by a certain degree of fluidity, dynamism and fitness, in the 
sense that they tend to adapt to the context and to be reshaped according to 
endogenous and exogenous factors (Barth 1996; Fontana and Sparti 2012). 
These processes of identity reshaping are often driven by instrumental 
tactics of social groups to increase their degree of fitness in specific 
particular circumstances and thus facilitate their access to resources and 
power. This characteristic of collective identities represents a key, although 
often neglected, issue in the moment of elaboration of a political strategy 
and designing of an institutional framework to manage ethno-cultural 
heterogeneity. In a context characterized by weak institutions and extensive 
socio-economic gaps, the introduction of incentives for ethnic self-
identification (in the framework of institutional reforms that could be 
considered a sort of ‘supply side multiculturalism’14) is likely to trigger a 
process of social fragmentation and encourage new conflicts between the 
state and social movements and among social movements themselves.15 
 
V. FRAGMENTATION AND SOCIAL CONFLICT 
The radical change of government and political power distribution 
that brought about the first electoral victory of Evo Morales at the end of 
2005, opened the possibility for a deep transformation of the state-civil 
society relationship. Optimistic expectations were wagering in favour of a 
redefinition of the conflict fields in the light of a new institutional 
framework. This would also include a new role for civil society in politics, 
which could possibly hold the potentiality of promoting a process of 
change in the nature of social conflicts themselves. Although conflict will 
not disappear, the change of paradigm in favour of inclusion and 
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democracy was expected to bring a shift and a decrease in the high level of 
conflicts in Bolivia. 
However, an in-depth analysis of social conflicts in the country over 
the last seven years recalibrates those expectations. Looking at the 
quantitative data on Bolivian social conflicts, the major evidence against 
predictions is that the number of disputes has escalated in the last few 
years, reaching significantly high peaks. If compared with thirteen other 
political conjunctures from 1970, the last one occupies the third place with 
regards to number of conflicts per year after the governments of Hernán 
Siles (1982-1985) and Carlos Mesa (2003-2005) (Laserna and Villarroel 
2008).  
    Fig. 1: Number of conflict per year in Bolivia between 1970 and 2007 
  
    Source: Laserna and Villarroel, 2008. 
When looking at the conflict dynamics from a qualitative point of 
view, there seems to be a double track that conflates longstanding causes 
and patterns of social tensions with new ones, which are strictly dependent 
on the current political conjuncture. Structural conflicts, which depend on 
the long-term characteristics of Bolivian social and economic structure – in 
particular, endemic inequalities and deep unresolved polarizations – coexist 
with functional conflicts, which arise from the endogenous contradictions 
of the transition process, and that are mainly politically rooted (Fontana 
2013).  
Some of these conflicts are disputes around land and resources and 
confront some of the most important Bolivian political actors: MAS 
government, indigenous movements and peasant unions. As in many other 
countries in Latin America, in Bolivia the agrarian issue has been at the 
core of unsolved tensions and cyclical struggles since the formation of the 
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modern state 200 years ago. Social movements have historically been the 
articulator of these fights. In particular, the land issue has been at the core 
of the claims of the two main traditions that have articulated Bolivian 
political struggle: indianism and national-populism (Thomson and Hylton 
2007:7).  
Different factors contribute to trigger conflicts over land and 
resources in Bolivia, including population growth, internal migrations, 
inheritance management that parcels up the properties (minifundio), and the 
foreign ownership of fertile lowlands (especially Brazilian soy plantations). 
This is coupled with a highly unequal system of land distribution among 
families and social groups16, which is the most important evidence of the 
failure of the agrarian reform started in 1953. The latter also contributed to 
the increasing of corruption and bureaucratization in land management 
(Urioste and Kay 2005). This complex situation contributes to explaining 
why land governance is a delicate matter in a highly unstable social and 
environmental context. 
Over the latest fifteen years, the conflict between indigenous and 
peasants has been further complicated, in part as a consequence of the 
recent Bolivian agrarian policies. In 1996, the INRA Law was approved, 
under the pressure of lowlands indigenous organizations. The latter were 
satisfied with the new norm – mainly because the law eventually 
recognized the Native Communitarian Lands (Tierras Comunitarias de 
Origen, TCO) as a form of property. In contract, the peasant movement 
remained at the margins of the debate. The Confederación Única de 
Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia – the main national peasant union – 
instructed its bases to avoid any contact with the INRA’s officers that 
would have visited the communities.17 As a result, the land clearing process 
in these areas had been halted for many years. This was one of the reasons, 
together with the availability of funds from international cooperation for 
the TCOs’ titling (and not for peasant land titling), and the relative 
procedural ease and political convenience18, which meant that the clearing 
process started in the lowlands and was postponed in the highlands. In 
other words, considering the ‘short history’ of the agrarian reform, 
indigenous organizations for various reasons received more benefits: the 
titling process started earlier, it was better funded and satisfied the calls of 
many indigenous groups for collective titles, prioritizing their demands 
with respect to the clearing of the peasant communitarian or individual 
lands.19 
This advantage came mainly from the process of institutionalization 
of a link between identity and ethnic belonging, and systems of resource 
allocation through the reforms of the agrarian law that took place over the 
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last two decades. As a consequence, the new normative framework 
introduced some incentives for ethnic identification, which, in some 
contexts, ended up favouring an instrumental use of indigenous identities. 
Different social groups started to build new identitarian boundaries, fuelled 
by ethnic-based narratives, mythologies and symbols, to distinguish 
themselves from competitor groups. In certain cases, this generated 
fractures within originally homogeneous communities.20 Identities and 
resource access became the most important factors that contributed to the 
radicalization of land and territorial conflicts at the local level between 
indigenous and peasant organizations (Fontana 2012b).  
At the same time, these intra-societal conflicts are one of the clearest 
and most explicit manifestations of the structural problem of MAS in its 
role of catalyzer and coordinator of different social forces. Over more than 
a decade, MAS has been the articulator of multiple subjects, organizations 
and social movements whereby none was the actual holder of ontological 
privileges in the construction of new collective political identities. These 
identities are therefore the result of contingent hegemonic fights. Within 
the social universe close to MAS, a new wave of identitarian and 
organizational construction, deconstruction and hybridization has generated 
conflicts for the control of corporatist power, and political and physical 
spaces. As a consequence of the identitarian and strategic crisis that the 
government is facing as cohesive political actor, fragmentation among 
social sectors has increased and a new system of alliances (and conflicts) 
was shaped, characterized by a higher degree of social tensions especially 
at the local level. In this sense, the problem of land tenure and management 
constitutes a key disputed issue among MAS’s rural allies, which reflects 
divergent visions of development, territorial organizations and systems of 
control and power management (Fontana 2012b).  
Critically the most important episode of conflict during 2010 was 
related to the land issue and, in particular, to the unclear definition of 
interdepartmental borders and natural resource exploitation (limestone and, 
possibly, uranium deposits). As a result, a long-lasting dispute between 
communities in the departments of Potosí and Oruro re-emerged and 
degenerated into a protracted conflict. At the end of July 2010, the clash 
radicalized, when the Potosí Civic Committee decided to take advantage of 
the existing tensions, mobilizing the population and asking for greater 
political autonomy. The accesses to the city were blocked and various 
pickets and hunger strikes were organized. After some attempts at dialogue 
and more than 20 days of mobilization, negotiations with the government 
were successful and a new agenda for Potosí was arranged. However, the 
local conflicts on interdepartmental borders continued for several months 
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before reaching a provisional agreement between the numerous 
communities involved (Los Tiempos 3.9.2010; La Revista Minera 
20.4.2010).  
One year later, another conflict linked to land challenged the 
Morales’ government. On August 15, 2011, indigenous groups started a 
march (the eighth) to protest against the construction of a road that would 
cut across the Isiboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory 
(TIPNIS). The indigenous organizations accused the government of 
ignoring the constitutional obligations that establishes a prior consultation 
process with the indigenous peoples on initiatives that would affect their 
territories. Moreover, in alliance with national and international 
environmentalist movements, they considered that the road would open the 
way to smuggling and to a colonization flow of coca-leaf growers 
(cocaleros), with whom a situation of conflict and tensions already existed. 
On the other side, the government stated that the new infrastructure – that 
would have been constructed by Brazilian companies – would contribute to 
connect the country to the great trans-American commercial corridors (in 
the framework of the Initiative for the Integration of Regional 
Infrastructure in South America, Iniciativa de Integración de la 
Infraestructura Regional en América Latina, IIRSA). Hence, this project 
would promote a new wave of development and economic growth. The 
government also accused indigenous groups of being manipulated by the 
American cooperation agency – the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) – that would have allegedly funded and provided 
political support to the march (Perrier Bruslé 2012). 
After one month on the march, indigenous peoples reached La Paz 
where a big demonstration took place to welcome them. On 24 October, 
under a raising public pressure, Morales’ government enacted a new law 
that prohibited the construction of the highway through the indigenous 
territory. Meanwhile, counter-demonstrations of sectors closer to the MAS 
(mainly peasant and cocalero) took place to support the construction of the 
road. Since the beginning of the mobilizations in Trinidad, the peasant and 
cocalero organizations maintained their loyalty to the government, 
accusing the indigenous peoples of betrayal of the Proceso de Cambio and 
of connivance with imperialist powers. This sounds peculiar for those who 
remember the first indigenous march in 1990. In that occasion, ‘Jallallas’21 
and pututus22 of Aymara and Quechua peasants received in a high pass 
called La Cumbre, a few kilometres from La Paz, the ‘hermanos’ coming 
from the lowlands to ask to president Paz Zamora the respect of their 
‘territory and dignity’. On that occasion, the peasant leaders welcomed the 
indigenous delegations and officially demanded that the government pay 
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attention to their claims. The former secretary of the peasant union, Mario 
Flores, said in his welcome speech that the event should be considered as a 
“re-encounter of 500 years of exploitation”, and the signal of an evident 
crisis of the elites that usurped social movements’ common “interests and 
territories” (Flores, quoted in Peralta 2011). 
The TIPNIS infrastructural project has been widely criticised from 
an environmental perspective for its effect on the protected area, and the 
variety of arguments put forward by the different parties has been deeply 
scrutinized, mainly focusing on the tense relationship between the 
government and lowland indigenous movements (Webber 2011, Wanderley 
2011, Brysk and Bennet 2012). In this context, I will rather concentrate on 
the tensions between social organizations. How is it possible that social 
sectors that seemed to be tied by feelings of ‘brotherhood’ and to share the 
same ‘destiny’ – whether suffering discrimination or triggering an 
emancipatory process (as during the cycle of social protests between 2000 
and 2005) – are now involved in a rather confrontational and tense 
relationship? I argue that recent events, and in particular the TIPNIS 
conflict, reflect a tendency towards the primacy of corporatist interests over 
potentially trans-cultural and trans-ethnic social fights. The boundaries 
between the indigenous and peasant worlds reveal once more their 
flexibility and capacity to adapt to the political contingency. After a period 
of alliances and mutual support to face the threats from external enemies – 
in particular, neoliberalism and oligarchic powers – social organizations are 
now undergoing a moment of fragmentation and contention over access to 
the same physical, symbolic and power spaces.  
Each sector puts in place its particularistic strategies, and identitarian 
issues become key instruments in social fights. On the one hand, the 
indigenous groups developed an environmentalist discourse in which they 
are the ‘Pachamama paladins’, glancing to global environmentalist 
movements,23 weaving a new alliance with the Bolivian urban middle class, 
and confronting a government which is no longer that of the first 
indigenous President, but a ‘neodevelopmentalist bureaucracy at the service 
of transnational companies’. On the other hand, the cocaleros and peasant 
unions revitalized their alliance with MAS through a pro-development and 
classist discourse. This allowed them to occupy a rhetorical space that had 
remained relatively empty since the Bolivian Workers Union (Central 
Obrera Boliviana, COB) and the left parties entered into a deep crisis at the 
beginning of the 1990s.  
The TIPNIS case also accounts for the arbitrariness of the empirical-
identitarian correspondence as well as the symbolic-discursive 
radicalization of some key identitarian categories. The persons who 
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marched to safeguard the TIPNIS were indigenous. However, were not 
those Aymara cocaleros who marched in support of the government also 
indigenous? The peasant was the one who blocked the march, but was not 
he/she also the marcher on the other side of the barricade? Drawing on the 
examples above, it is evident the lack of clarity that ‘indigenous’ as an 
analytical category is esperiencing. There is an overlapping of levels 
whereby, depending on the social aggregate under consideration, certain 
actors find it worthwhile to use or to refuse ethnic-based categories. For 
example, many Aymaras and Quechuas perform ‘outward indigeneity’ in 
order to participate in the transnational global community, when they 
consider that the relevant aggregate is the world and they need to gain 
collective strength and alliances to be recognized as relevant actors. 
However, the same groups ‘inwardly’ refuse the indigenous category and 
prefer to call themselves ‘native’ or ‘peasant’, in contrast with the lowland 
self-defined indigenous. Therefore, they position themselves as different 
and, often, as rival actors within a political arena characterized by a 
fragmentation of the potential enemies and a fight for the same resources 
and spaces. 
Nonetheless, there are also many key elements in common between 
the two groups, which are often undermined by the dominant discourse. 
Both indigenous and peasant sectors are often confronted with 
unsustainable poverty conditions, both need land to subsist, both put in 
place strategies to guarantee their precarious social reproduction. 
Moreover, both these strategies are based on the construction and 
strengthening of oppositional identities, on the effort to occupy of 
symbolical and discursive spaces and on the weaving of alliances and 
supportive nets. Eventually, both groups are fighting for the same limited 
resources. As Canessa (2012:9) noted, what is surprising in the TIPNIS 
case is that “this occurred in a state which is led by an indigenous president 
who has placed indigeneity at the very center of how he expresses the 
legitimacy of his rule and has explicitly created a series of very public 
rituals to match his rhetoric of having created an indigenous state”. In this 
turbulent framework, a pertinent question to pose is whether the leading 
role of the indigenous-popular sectors as dominant coalition – as it was 
called by García Linera (2010) – is still in place. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
From the analysis of contemporary conflict in Bolivia, and in 
particular, of its articulation around cultural, narrative and identitarian axes, 
more general reflections can be made on the historical moment that the 
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country is living through, and especially on the complexity and 
heterogeneity of the Proceso de Cambio. The crisis of the alliance between 
MAS and the indigenous sectors has reached a critical point, and tensions 
have been growing also between rural social movements themselves. This 
will probably open up the way to new configurations and re-articulation of 
political and social equilibria.  
As I have argued in this article, the TIPNIS conflict, despite its 
exceptionalities in terms of magnitude and media attention, is not an 
isolated episode. Yet it forms part of a broader political and historical 
framework in which the relationship between the government and social 
forces, as well as the balance of power between rural movements 
themselves have been changing, following the rhythm of new political 
alliances, institutional reforms and international transformations.  
In their fluidity and interactional dynamics, identity-building 
processes have actively contributed to these changes. Ethnic identities, in 
particular, were crucial factors of social cohesion during the ‘social fights 
cycle’, becoming soon after factors of disarticulation and tension among 
rural movements. This is mainly due to a major change in political 
dynamics (started in the moment in which Morales was elected and MAS 
got in control of state power) as well as to a deepening of the process of 
normative and institutional reforms. The latter actively contributed to 
strengthening the link between ethno-cultural identities and resources and 
power allocation, especially concerning land management and control over 
natural resources.  
The tensions implicit in the new normative framework are reflected 
in the conflictive landscape since Morales’ re-election in 2009. Over the 
last eight years, new social tensions have gained importance as well as a 
national (in some cases even international) dimension. A key space of 
dispute in the recent political phase is constituted by conflicts over land, 
territory and resources. While they were traditionally portrayed as struggles 
between rural communities and big landowners, over the last years the 
focus of land disputes has been shifting towards inter-organizational 
confrontations (mainly between peasant, cocalero and indigenous 
organizations). The TIPNIS case represents the most notorious and 
internationalized among these conflicts. Critically, they embody crucial 
problems that the coalition in power should confront: on the one side, the 
crisis of MAS as effective catalyzer of popular forces; and, on the other 
side, the corporatist logics that still govern Bolivian social movements’ 
actions and fights. 
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NOTES  
1 The TIPNIS is an area of 1,2 million hectareas between the departments of Beni and 
Cochabamba. It was declared a national park in 1965 and in 2009 the indigenous groups 
Yuracaré, Mojeños-Ignaciano and Chimán that occupy this land received a collective 
title for their territory.  
2 Over the last two decades, Bolivian indigenous movements organized various marches 
(nine in total) across the country, to protest against the governments and claiming for 
rights (mainly concerning the control over their lands and territories) and political 
visibility.  
3 This paper is part of a broader research on Bolivian social conflicts, identity and 
narrative building processes in the framework of my PhD dissertation in Political 
Science. The empirical data were collected during two years of fieldwork (between 
2009 and 2011) and are constituted mainly by almost 80 interviews with political, social 
and international actors, various participant observations and eight research workshops 
with social movements leaders and grassroots in rural areas.  
4 I refer here to the political doctrine and normative reforms that become dominant in 
Bolivia from the mid-80s which results from the interconnection of neoliberal values 
(and mainly the free market) and multiculturalism as a body of thought of contemporary 
political philosophy about the proper way to respond to cultural and religious diversity 
through the recognition of ‘group-differentiated rights’ (Kymlicka 1995). See among 
others, Postero 2004; Lacroix 2007; Gros 1999; Gros and Dumoulin Kervran 2012; 
Marinissen 1998. 
5 Here I refer to Bolivian ethno-cultural movements at large, including, on the one side, 
the lowlands indigenous movements which gathered around the Confederation of 
Indigenous People of Bolivia (Central de los Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia, CIDOB) 
and the highlands native movements represented by the National Council of Ayllus and 
Markas of the Qullasuyu (Consejo Nacional of Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu, 
CONAMAQ).  
6 The peasant union movement gained strength in Bolivia since the national revolution 
of 1952, when the corporate structure was used as a mechanism to foster political 
participation and citizenship. This was couple with a process of mestizaje, which gave 
precedence to classist over ethnic identity as collective self-identification structures. 
The national peasant syndicate Unique Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia 
(Confederación Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia, CSUTCB), however, is 
not a homogeneous movement, since it includes various streams in tension with each 
other, in particular a wing closer to Katarist indianism, a Marxist stream and an 
important delegation of coca growers and colonizers (the peasants of Quechua or 
Ayamara origin moving from the highlands to more favourable environmental 
conditions in the valleys and plains of the East). 
7 “Democracy is implemented in the following ways that would be developed by law: 1. 
Direct and participative, through referendum, citizens’ legislative initiative, recall 
elections, assembly, cabildo and previous consultation, among others. (...) 2. 
Representative, through representatives’ elections through universal, direct and secret 
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vote, according to the law. 3. “Communitarian, through election, designation and 
normative regulation of authorities and representatives through norms and procedures, 
typical of the native indigenous peasant peoples and nations, among others, according to 
the law” (Art. 11 of the Political Constitution). 
8 Welfare programs include a popular retirement account for senior citizens, a national 
subsidy to schoolchildren and their families, a national literacy program, and a zero-
malnutrition program to eliminate childhood malnutrition (Weisbrot and Sandoval 2007, 
quoted in Postero 2007).  
9 In Bolivia, the multicultural political project and narrative were key during the first 
half of the 1990s, in correspondence with the so-called ‘neoliberal social reformism’ 
(Saleman 2010:118). They worked as a strategy of contention in front of the increasing 
social tensions from the raise of new discourse and indigenous peoples’ organizations, 
under the influence of intellectual and political transnational currents. Through a 
circular and dialectic dynamic, the official multiculturalist discourse and the high 
number of ethno-development politics sponsored by the international cooperation 
agencies contributed to strengthen and multiply ethnicization processes. 
10 Every native language is official in its influence area and they are compulsory for 
public employers. 
11Teleology is to be intended here in his broader meaning: a process or action which is 
for the sake of an end, a final cause. What I intend to emphasis here is the fact that, in 
certain contexts and in almost all modern societies, development is understood as a 
process which, through a series of consecutive steps (including for example economic 
growth and industrialization), would lead to well-being and to a condition of general 
improvement with respect to the present. This is a dominant paradigm often taken as 
given in modern political economy which however has clear historical origins (as 
brilliantly described by Albert Hirschman in his book The Passions and the Interests: 
Political Arguments For Capitalism Before Its Triumph, 1970. On development as a 
historically produced discourse see Arturo Escobar 2010). 
12 Some key identities in this sense are peasant, indigenous, native, but also Camba and 
Kolla, i.e. cultural-based popular words to identify people from the highlands (West) 
and from the lowlands (East). 
13 I define the communitarian identity as a meta-identity, highlighting its structural 
dimension which describe the form, not the substance, of the identity, i.e. the fact that 
an identity is defined by a supra-communitarian dimension. Community in this 
framework is used to define a group of individuals which share the same environment 
and strong common ties and feelings of belonging. In its structural meaning, this 
definition applies both to indigenous and peasant groups.  
14Christian Gros uses the expression ‘public neoindigenism’ to express a similar 
concept, i.e. the ensemble of state-driven multicultural strategies (2000).  
15 Given the alliance of paradigms and visions of Latin American states and the 
international community, the Subcontinent constitutes the most important setting where 
these kinds of processes took place. However similar dynamics were reported in other 
regions of the world, triggered mainly by the changed in the international legal 
framework. In particular, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
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Peoples and the International Labour Organization 169 Convention provided incentive 
for minority groups to self-identify as indigenous peoples. An example is constituted by 
the Arab-speaking minority of the Ahwaz region of Iran (Kymlicka 2007:284).  
16 According to INRA data (2006), in Bolivia the 91 per cent of the land would be in the 
hands of big landowners, while the 71 per cent of the population would count only on 
the nine per cent of the land.  
17 Interview with a CSUTCB technical advisor, July 2010.  
18 The issuing of only one title for big territorial extensions of thousands of hectares 
require a reduced technical effort and guarantee an increase in the numbers concerning 
titled land, being thus politically convenient. However, as the organizations involved in 
saneamiento can confirm, TCO land titling generally constitute a complex and often 
highly conflictive process, and the INRA doesn’t hold legitimacy and technical 
efficiency to deal with land disputes in many local spaces.  
19 With this statement I do not imply that the clearing and titling process of TCO/TIOCs 
has occurred without problems. In this respect, data and critical points are pointed out in 
the report of the Fundación Tierra, Territorios Indígenas Originarios Campesinos en 
Bolivia, 2010.  
20 My PhD thesis Social Conflicts, Collective Narratives and Identity-building: Lessons 
from Bolivia, 2012, studies the generation of new ethnogenesis processes and the link 
with institutional reforms and land conflicts. In particular, two chapters are dedicated to 
the analysis and comparison between two case studies of land conflicts, one in the 
Apolo region (Franz Tamayo Province) and the other in Quila Quila (Oropeza 
Province).  
21 Aymara expression of hope, satisfaction and gratitude that is used in greetings or in 
religious rituals. 
22 A sound device typical of the Andean region. ‘Blowing horn’ in English.  
23 The TIPNIS conflict attracted attention and solidarity by many environmentalist and 
ecologist movements. Among others Juventud Ecologista and the Spanish network 
Ecologistas en acción. However, the protection of the natural environment was not a 
key point from the beginning of the protest. It was rather used to reinforce other 
priorities such as the defence of territory and autonomy (McNeish 2013).  
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